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ARCHIBALD COX*
Fitting the ever-growing bodies of regulatory law into a federal system
in which the sum of regulatory power is shared between the national
government and the states raises perennial problems of conflict and
accommodation. Often both governments have concurrent jurisdiction
unless Congress preempts the field. In the latter event, state law and often
the jurisdiction of state tribunals are ousted by virtue of the supremacy
clause.' Whether Congress has preempted the field is a matter of legislative
intent. Since Congress more often than not fails to express its will directly,
the problem with which the courts must wrestle quickly becomes one of
statutory interpretation.
In the field of industrial relations there has been more than thirty years
of fighting over the boundary lines defining the realm of exclusive federal
control. The enactment of the Taft-Hartley "Slave Labor" Act in 19472
conferred several unexpected bonanzas upon those who expostulated that
they would thereby be enslaved.3 The chief benefit was immunity from
state law limiting strikes, boycotts, and picketing. By prohibiting some
forms of strike, boycott, and picketing as union unfair labor practices,4
Congress laid the foundation for the argument that the federal pro-
hibitions are exclusive. This argument provided an avenue of escape from
the much more restrictive state statutes and court decisions. The Supreme
Court took the cases as they came, but by 1959 the Justices were able to
enunciate a formula that has become known as the Garmon rule.5 The
Garmon rule asserts that the states as well as the federal courts must yield
exclusive jurisdiction to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
whenever the conduct that the state seeks to regulate is in an area subject to
NLRB jurisdiction and is also either (1) prohibited or arguably prohibited
by section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) or (2)
protected or arguably protected by section 7 of the Act. A number of
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1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
2. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1976)).
3. For example, labor unions have benefited much more than employers from § 301, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1976). which not only confers jurisdiction upon the United States district courts to entertain
actions for violation of a collective bargaining agreement, but also has been interpreted to authorize the
federal courts to build a body of substantive law.
4. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
5. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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narrow exceptions to the Garmon rule later were developed for particular
situations.6
A second and supplementary formula appears to advance the
proposition that a state may not forbid or award damages for conduct in a
labor dispute, even though the conduct is plainly neither prohibited nor
protected by national law, if the application of state law would upset the
balance of power between labor and management established by the
NLRA. In Teamsters Union v. Morton a local union, engaged in a labor
dispute with a concern that hired out trucks and drivers for use in highway
construction, requested the firm's customers to stop renting its products.
There was neither threat nor other coercion by the union. When one
customer agreed, the rental firm brought an action for damages, alleging
violation of Ohio's secondary boycott law. The trial court granted
judgment for the plaintiff, but the United States Supreme Court reversed
because Congress had chosen not to forbid voluntary assistance to a union
engaged in a labor dispute.
This weapon of self-help, permitted by federal law, formed an integral
part of the petitioner's effort to achieve its bargaining goals during
negotiations with the respondent. Allowing its use is a part of the balance
struck by Congress between the conflicting interests of the union, the
employees, the employer and the community. Electrical Workers Local 761 v.
Labor Board, 366 U.S. 667, 672. If the Ohio law of secondary boycott can be
applied to proscribe the same type of conduct which Congress focused upon
but did not proscribe when it enacted [8(b)(4)], the inevitable result would be
to frustrate the congressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help
available, and to upset the balance of power between labor and management
expressed in our national labor policy. "For a state to impinge on the area of
labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal
policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes orby methods
which the federal Act prohibits." Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485,
500. 8
Subsequently, Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion9 held that a state may not deal with a concerted refusal to work
overtime, not because a union's refusal to work overtime is at least
arguably protected or prohibited by the national law, but rather because it
is an economic weapon that Congress has neither protected nor pro-
hibited, thus implying that it should be left to the free, unregulated inter-
play of the relative economic strength of management and union.
These two formulae, taken together, seemed to cover almost all of the
6. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171(1967) (breach of the duty of fair representation); Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195(1962) (judicial relief for breach of a contract that also constituted
an unfair labor practice); International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351
U.S. 266 (1956) (injunction against violence); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co., 347
U.S. 656 (1954) (damages for violence in a labor dispute).
7. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
8. Id. at 259-60.
9. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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preemption problems in the law of strikes and picketing. Certain issues,
however, remained unresolved-including the question whether a state
has power to enjoin or punish, as a continuing trespass, picketing on
private property. The Supreme Court faced this question in 1978 and
edged toward a decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters.'° The ruling, for reasons elaborated upon
below, gives only a very narrow, partial answer to this specific but vexing
problem, but at least for a time the Sears opinion seemed to represent a
major effort by Justice Stevens to expand state power, first, by confining
the law of preemption to the Garmon rule and, second, by adding new
exceptions.
The potential importance of Sears was diminished, however, when the
Court ruled in New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of
Labor," that NLRA policy does not bar a state from paying unemploy-
ment compensation to strikers even though the payments and concomitant
charges against the employer's rating are likely to have substantial effects
upon the relative bargaining power of management and union. The
opinion of the Court, which was once again delivered by Justice Stevens,
seems to adopt an approach, discussed in further detail below, that Stevens
expressly had disavowed in the Machinists case.
A third recent development in federal labor law preemption bears
upon the question, discussed later in this Article, whether a collective
bargaining agreement between management and labor on a statutory
subject of collective bargaining in accordance with the NLRA immunizes
the employer's violation of a state law regulating the same term or
condition of employment.
I. PREEMPTION IN THE LAW OF STRIKES AND PICKETING
A. The Sears Case
The automobile, the private parking lot, the retail mall or shopping
center, and the industrial park gradually have increased the importance of
the law of trespass in union organization and labor disputes. In an
organizing campaign, union organizers who are not employees find
distribution of leaflets and personal contacts with employees as they leave
their automobiles in the employer's parking lot vastly more effective than
patrolling and leafleting as the employees drive by on the public highway.
Similarly, in a labor dispute involving a suburban retail store set apart with
its own parking facilities, picketing near the entrance doors is more
effective than patrolling the public ways bounding the premises. The
problem is most acute in relation to privately owned shopping centers and
retail malls since, in those cases, neither union organizers nor pickets can
reach either the employees or the customers of a single store without going
10. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
II. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
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upon private property over the objection of the shopping center's owner
and operator, which has leased space to several stores.
For a time, the United States Supreme Court flirted with treating
privately owned shopping centers as if they were public streets or parks for
the purposes of the first and fourteenth amendments, 12 but that avenue was
closed to the unions by the decision in Hudgens v. NLRB.13 As a result,
union organizers and pickets are considered to be trespassers except as
they can show that NLRA sections 7 and 8(a)(1) give them a statutory
privilege to enter upon the private property in order to implement fully
their rights to organize and to engage in concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection.
In time, the NLRB may define the extent of this privilege with respect
to the several categories of organizers and pickets. Conceivably, there will
be distinct rules for shopping centers and for the property of a single
establishment, for organizational leafleting and for picketing, and for
picketing at the primary site of a labor dispute and for secondary appeals
to retail buyers of products manufactured by an employer that is the real
target of the union's concerted activities. All this will take time.
Meanwhile, the important question is whether state courts may entertain
an application for an injunction against the alleged trespass, or whether,
because of federal preemption, they are ousted ofjurisdiction. Occasional-
ly, a similar question is raised by arrest and prosecution of pickets for
criminal trespass.
The Sears case involved picketing upon the property of a single retail
establishment. Sears' store was in a large block surrounded by its own
parking lot, which was bounded in turn by public sidewalks. The
Carpenters Union, protesting Sear's use of a contractor who employed
non-union carpenters, set up pickets in the Sear's parking lot and near the
store's doors. Sears obtained a temporary injunction against the picketing
in the California Superior Court, but the Supreme Court of California set
the injunction aside on the ground that the picketing was not only
"arguably prohibited" as recognition picketing forbidden by NLRA
section 8(b)(c), but also "arguably protected" by sections 7 and 8(a)(1),
which arguably confer a right to enter upon the employer's property under
circumstances in which there is no other method of appealing to employees
and the public. 14 By a 6-3 vote, the United States Supreme Court reversed
upon the ground that neither the "arguably prohibited" nor the "arguably
protected" branch of the Garmon rule called for preemption in the Sears
case.15
12. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
13. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
14. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893,553
P.2d. 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
15. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
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1. "arguably prohibited"
A showing that the conduct of which the plaintiff complains in the
state court is arguably prohibited by the NLRA is never enough to
establish conclusively that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. Common
sense repels so broad a claim of exclusivity. No one would suggest that,
because it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to beat-up union
organizers and run them out of town, the state is deprived of power to
prosecute the employer, or the organizers have no private right to recover
damages under state law. Supreme Court decisions also sustain the power
of state courts to award compensation for losses inflicted by mass picketing
or other violence in a labor dispute,1 6 and even to enjoin such
misconduct, 7 despite a showing that the same activities are prohibited by
NLRA section 8(b)(1).
In earlier articles, I have suggested that preemption should extend to,
but should also be confined to, those cases in which the relief sought under
state law is based upon a judgment that focuses upon the interests of
employers, unions, employees, and the general public in employee self-
organization, collective bargaining, or a labor-management dispute:
Congress obviously had its own views concerning the special rights and duties
to be imposed upon employers, unions, and employees because of their
relation to employee self-organization and free collective bargaining. Where
further particularization would be appropriate, it delegated the function to a
specially constituted administrative agency. But it is equally plain that Con-
gress developed this special framework for self-organization and collective
bargaining within a larger context of state law creating rights of property,
bodily security, and personality, preserving public order, and promoting pub-
lic health and welfare. These laws apply to the general public or substantial
segments thereof without regard to whether the individual is an employer,
union, or employee concerned with unionization or a labor dispute. Neither
the laws themselves nor any particular application involves weighing the
special interests of employers, unions, employees, or the public in employee
self-organization, collective bargaining, or labor disputes. The likelihood
that the collateral impact of such laws upon management or labor will
upset the national balance is small enough to permit their operation unless
interference with a specific federal right can be affirmatively demonstrated.
It is only where the state law or rule of decision is based upon an accommoda-
tion of the special interests of employers, unions, employees, or the public in
employee self-organization, collective bargaining, or labor disputes that the
likelihood that is application to persons under NLRB jurisdiction will upset
the balance struck by Congress is so great as to require exclusion of state law
unless Congress has provided otherwise.' s
State laws dealing with trespass upon privately owned property have
general application utterly independent of any appraisal of the special
16. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
17. International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266(1956).
18. Cox. Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1355-56 (1972); see also
Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954).
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interests of employers, labor unions, and employees in union organization
or collective bargaining. Under this approach, therefore, the California
state courts had jurisdiction to deal with the picketing of Sears unless the
pickets were exercising or arguably exercising a federal right granted by
NLRA sections 7 and 8(a)(1).
Although the decisions of the United States Supreme Court seem to
me to be entirely consistent with this approach, the Court's opinions
expressly have repudiated the approach on several occasions.1 9 Speaking
for the Court in Sears, Mr. Justice Stevens again rejected the distinction:
The critical inquiry therefore is not whether the State is enforcing a law
relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but
whether the controversy presented to the State court is identical to (as in
Garner) or different from (as in Farmer) that which could have been, but was
not, presented to the Labor Board.20
Less than a year later, Justice Stevens would treat as decisive against
preemption the fact that the challenged state statute "is a law of general
applicability., 21 In Sears, however, Justice Stevens found that the
"arguably prohibited" branch of the Garmon rule was inapplicable
because the controversy presented to the California court was not the same
as the controversy that Sears might have presented to the Labor Board.
Before the Labor Board, subtle questions concerning the Carpenters'
purposes and the interpretation of sections 8(b)(4)(D) and 8(b)(7)(C) of the
NLRA would have been presented. Before the state court, however, the
proof would relate to the location of the pickets and the ownership or
possession of the property on which the picketing occurred.
Justice Stevens' formulation of the exceptions to the arguably-
prohibited branch of the Garmon rule drew heavily upon the reasoning in
19. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25,430 U.S. 290,300(1977); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S.
468, 479-80 (1955).
20. 436 U.S. at 197. A cautionary footnote to the passage from which the sentence in the text is
quoted suggests that Justice Stevens was inclined to agree, even at the time of Sears, that certain state
laws of general applicability might not be vulnerable under a Morton-Machinists analysis, even though
their application to a labor controversy would affect the balance of power between management and
union.
The analysis might be improved by clarifying definitions and by adopting more consistent useage.
The Court's opinions prior to the N. Y Telephone case cite state antitrust laws as examples of "laws of
general applicability." Obviously their application is, and should be, preempted in the case of a labor
controversy between persons subject to NLRB jurisdiction. Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 282
(1959); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955). But antitrust laws are not always written
in such general terms that their application to labor controversies depends, as in other situations, upon
a particularized judicial appraisal of the interests of labor, management, individual employees, and the
public that Congress sought to balance in the NLRA. See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited. 85
HARV. L. REv. 1337, 1357-58 (1972). This, not the application of the shorthand phrase "law of general
applicability," should be the critical inquiry in determining which state laws are preempted.
The term "law of general applicability" may be an inept phrase for abbreviating the underlying
principle, but I can devise no better way of avoiding tedious repetition of the entire proposition
whenever it is necessary to refer to it.
21. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519,533 (1979), which is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 55-70 infra.
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• 22
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters. The plaintiff Farmer was
administrator of the estate of Richard Hill, who had been a carpenter and
an official of the local carpenters union. After an internal union row,
according to Hill, the local began to discriminate against him in job
referrals and then to subject him to a campaign of personal abuse and
harassment in addition to continued discrimination. Hill brought suit in
the Superior Court of California. Three counts of the amended complaint
focused upon interference with employment opportunities and alleged
violations of a collective bargaining agreement, while one count alleged the
intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting in bodily injury. The
Superior Court allowed the latter count to go to the jury upon instructions
that Hill was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
suffered some "highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief,
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, or
worry."23 The jury returned a verdict against the union of $7500 actual
damages and $175,000 punitive damages. On appeal, the California courts
reversed the judgment and ordered dismissal.
The United States Supreme Court unaminously reversed, holding
that the NLRA does not deprive state courts of jurisdiction to entertain
actions for the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. The
opinion began with a strong reaffirmation of both branches of the Garmon
rule, but then acknowledged numerous exceptions. In an effort to
rationalize the exceptions, the Court-relying on precedents allowing state
courts to hear cases alleging defamation or violence-suggested that three
factors were always present:
(1) the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the state action is not
protected or arguably protected by the NLRA;
(2) there is "an overriding state interest" that is "deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility"; and
(3) there is little risk that the state cause of action will interfere with the
effective administration of national labor policy.
The Court implied that three additional factors should be considered
in applying the third requirement: First, whether the elements of the state
cause of action are different from those that would support an unfair labor
practice charge; second, whether different remedies are available in the
state court; and third, whether the state court action can be adjudicated
without regard to the merits of the underlying labor dispute. In the Farmer
case, Justice Powell concluded that the state action for intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress satisfied all the requirements, and
that the state court therefore had jurisdiction. Although, superficially, the
22. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
23. Id. at 294.
24. 49 Cal. App. 3d 614, 122 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1975), vacated, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
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decision reads as a victory for the individual employee, I am relatively
certain that the employee and his attorney regarded the Supreme Court's
action as a major setback, if not a total defeat. Even though both the
plaintiff and the Court thought, and the Court held, that dismissal of the
complaint by the California appellate courts was improper, the Court
refused to reinstate the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. The opinion gives
two reasons: First, the evidence supporting the verdict had focused less on
a campaign of harassment, public ridicule, and verbal abuse than on
hostile discrimination in refusing to dispatch the plaintiff to any but the
least desirablejobs; and second, thejury was not instructed that something
more than the emotional distress resulting from the threat or actuality of
abuse of the union's power to make or withhold job referrals must be
proved before it could find for the plaintiff. Indeed, a footnote instructs
trial courts to "be sensitive to the need to minimize the jury's exposure to
evidence of employment discrimination,"" and also to give instructions
that the fact of such discrimination should not enter into the determination
of liability or damages.
In my judgment, the approach formulated in Farmer and applied in
Sears carries federal preemption to undesirable lengths in the area of
controversies between individual workers and a labor union. In contrast
with its approach to labor-management relations, Congress has never
developed a comprehensive federal plan for regulation of relations
between a union and its members. Federal laws supplement state rights
and remedies only interstitially. The problems resulting from union job
control under a closed or union shop agreement straddle both fields. On
the one hand, the membership clause in a union security agreement may be
an organizing tool, compelling employees to become union members,
enriching the union treasury, and securing the union's status as exclusive
bargaining representative. On the other hand, when the union is strong and
its status secure, the chief consequence of unionjob control is to enhance
the effectiveness of sanctions for a union member's breach of union
discipline by depriving the individual of his job if he is expelled from the
union. Even in the former situation, in which the union is in the initial
stages of organization, controversies essentially between the individual
and the union present scant danger of any substantial interference with
broad national labor policy, unless one believes that the policy embraces
protecting labor unions against heavy liability to individual members. And
in the latter situation, in which the union has become securely established,
there is no danger at all. Yet, in both situations, the effect of the Farmer
decision is to require the individual union member to split between two
forums-the state court and the NLRB-a claim that could be tried more
fairly in one.
It is more difficult to predict the effect of the Farmer-Sears approach
25. 430 U.S. at 305 n.13.
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within the area of labor-management relations. Justice Stevens wrote in
Sears that in applying the "arguably prohibited" branch of the Garmon
rule "[t]he critical inquiry .. . is .. .whether the controversy present-
ed to the State court is identical to (as in Garner) or different from (as in
Farmer) that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor
Board. 26
But the Justice obviously did not intend us to read him literally.
Earlier decisions make it plain that there may be no preemption even
though the controversy presented to the state court is identical to the
27controversy that might have been presented to the Labor Board. A
complaint praying for a state court injunction against a labor union's mass
picketing, for example, alleges the very same facts as an NLRB charge
alleging violation of section 8(b)(1), yet the state court may grant both
preventive and compensatory relief.28 One cannot reasonably suppose that
the Court meant any more than that there is no preemption under the
"arguably prohibited" branch of the Garmon rule if the state controversy is
not "identical with" the controversy that might have been submitted to the
Labor Board.
Even this interpretation of Sears suggests a conscious or unconscious
rewriting of decisional precepts in ways that imply a significant narrowing
of the area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The more widely the applicable
state substantive law differs from the federal law, the greater will be the
differences in the proof required to make a case for judicial relief. When
this is true, the argument against preemption under the Farmer-Sears
formula will also be the stronger. The logical consequence is that the wider
a state's departure from the national balance of the interests in union
organization and collective bargaining, the greater freedom the state will
have to upset the national policy.
This logic will not disturb those who reject the Machinists rationale
and view the Garmon rule and its exceptions as an all-sufficient measure of
the extent of federal premption.29 The Justice Stevens who was speaking
for the Court in Sears apparently belonged to this school. He had dissented
in Machinists,30 and in Sears he impliedly rejected Machinists, referring to
the two aspects of the Garmon rule as "the general guidelines for
deciphering the unexpressed intent of Congress regarding the permissible
scope of State regulation of activity touching upon labor-management
relations."3 ' He also explained the "arguably prohibited" branch of thie
26. 436 U.S. at 197.
27. See International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266
(1956).
28. See International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266
(1956): United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
29. The most complete exposition of this view is the opinion written by Justice Harlan for the
Court in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
30. 427 U.S. at 156-69.
31. 436 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
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Garmon rule exclusively in terms of the risk that two tribunals with
concurrent jurisdiction might follow divergent procedures, make
inconsistent findings, and grant different remedies. Neither the risks nor
the resulting damage to federal policy would be inconsiderable, but the
harm seems small in comparison to the harm that would result from
allowing a state to enforce a substantively different labor-management
relations law. The latter danger seemingly did not worry Justice Stevens.
In support of his narrow rationale, he quoted a portion of Justice
Jackson's opinion.for the Court in Garner v. Teamsters Union,32 in which
the Court first held that a state had no jurisdiction to enjoin conduct
prohibited by the NLRA because:
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.
Indeed, Pennsylvania passed a statute the same year as its labor relations Act
reciting abuses of the injunction in labor litigations attributable more to
procedure and usage than to substantive rules. A multiplicity of tribunals and
a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or
conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.33
Justice Stevens did not quote the portion of Justice Jackson's opinion
explaining the danger to national policy if the states were allowed to apply
divergent substantive law:
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types of
picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of other
methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the national Labor
Management Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that
ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions.
Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom
of labor to use the weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of
labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal
policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods
which the federal Act prohibits.3 4
It was this portion of the Garner opinion upon which the Court relied to
find preemption in the Machinists case, over Justice Stevens' dissent.35
There is further reason to think that the Sears opinion sought to
undermine both the last quoted passage from Garner and the Machinists
decision. One spontaneously rejects any suggestion that a state may never
grant remedies for trespassory picketing because the omission of any
federal prohibition implies that the conduct is to be left free of regulation.
If the common sense reaction is correct, as I believe it to be, one ought to be
able to give a reason that fits into a coherent body of principle. My reason
32. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
33. 346 U.S. at 490-91, quoted in Sears, 436 U.S. at 192-93.
34. 346 U.S. at 499-500.
35. 427 U.S. at 144.
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is that a state trespass law is a law of general application. At the time of
Sears, Justice Stevens would have rejected this reason. The only other
rationale that I can formulate is that states are free to regulate activities
neither plainly protected nor prohibited by the NLRA.
Perhaps these speculations strain too hard to find implications in the
words and reasoning of one segment of the Court's opinion in a single case.
Yet serious consequences follow from analyzing preemption exclusively in
terms akin to primary jurisdiction instead of focusing upon the need to
protect the balance of power struck by national policy in the field of union
organization and labor management relations. The first approach assumes
that federal law is a collection of particular rights and duties rather than a
complete and comprehensive policy. It thus implies that there is room for
the intrusion of state labor relations policies regulating conduct that is left
plainly unregulated by federal law. The second approach posits the
opposite characterization and consequences. The Justices can hardly have
been unmindful of the differences, even though the choice of rationale was
probably immaterial to the outcome of the Sears case. Furthermore, the
same disposition to narrow the area from which state law is excluded runs
through the portion of the Sears opinion dealing with the claim that the
"arguably protected" branch of the Garmon rule barred the California
state court from exercising jurisdiction.
2. "arguably protected"
Labor cases aside, when a federal right is asserted as a defense in state
litigation, the state court normally interprets the federal law as best it can
at all stages of the litigation, subject to ultimate review by the Supreme
Court of the United States.3 6 If this course were followed in a case like
Sears, the state court of first instance would have to decide whether the
picketing should be enjoined as a continuing trespass or tolerated as the
exercise of a privilege of entry actually given by the NLRA. The NLRA
precedents gave and still give little guidance. If the state court decided the
NLRA issue against the privilege and were "right," justice would be done.
If the state court decided "wrong," the decision would deprive the union of
a privilege granted by federal law unless-and, in any event, until-the
decision was reversed on appeal.
The labor preemption cases followed a different course, at least in part
because the United States Supreme Court wished to guard against the
danger of delay or denial of a federal privilege. The Garmon rule directs
state courts to keep out whenever it is even "arguable" that the concerted
activities are protected by federal law. The risks of interference with federal
rights were considerable when the rule was formulated. Many state courts
had been notably hostile to union activities and inhospitable to federal
policies concerning union organization and collective bargaining, even
36. See. e.g.. Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
though certain union activity, such as peaceful picketing, approaches the
status of a preferred first amendment liberty. In some labor disputes, even
temporary interference with what is in truth a privilege granted by federal
law may have critical importance.
A second justification for the "arguably protected" branch of the
Garmon rule is the need for NLRB expertise in resolving whether the
conduct that the employer seeks to enjoin is an NLRA-protected concerted
activity. The Supreme Court decisions increasingly speak of the deference
that is to be given NLRB interpretations.37 The balance to be struck
between an employer's proprietary and managerial interests on one hand,
and the employees' or unions' interests in union organization and
concerted activities, on the other, has always been a question peculiarly
suited for informed agency discretion.38 The NLRB may appear as amicus
curiae in the Supreme Court of the United States, but it would be
impracticable to file regularly in the highest state courts and impossible to
take part at the crucial phase in all courts of first instance. Furthermore,
the NLRB as amicus can neither express the judgments nor be given the
deference resulting from a finding upon a trial record.
While these are weighty considerations, the "arguably protected"
branch of the Garmon rule also carries risks of unfairness to those injured
by picketing that is forbidden by a state law of general application. Not
every arguably protected activity is in truth protected. In a case in which
the activities are arguably protected but in truth unprotected, the Garmon
rule denies the employer a remedy to which it is entitled unless-and, in
any event, until-it finds some way of securing an NLRB determination. If
a prompt method of reaching the NLRB is available, little harm is done. If
no method is available, as seemed to be the situation with respect to the
allegedly trespassory picketing in Garmon, the employer is denied a day in
court and thus shut off from the hope of obtaining a remedy for what may
well be a substantive wrong. In effect the law would be asserting that "the
legal system requires NLRB participation in order to be sure of doing
justice. Since that assurance cannot be obtained, the law may not try to do
justice at all." Deeming this assertion to be unjust, some judges and
commentators have argued that state courts should be allowed to decide
the NLRA question to the best of their ability, as in non-labor cases.
Although there is still no way for an employer to obtain directly a
ruling upon whether the conduct of pickets is a protected concerted
activity, the NLRB asserted in its amicus brief in the Sears case that a
demand that the pickets leave the property "would constitute a sufficient
37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507 (1977);NLRBv. Magnavox
Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
38. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB.
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
39. See, e.g., Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 227 (1970) (Burger, C. J., Stewart &
White, JJ., concurring); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1297. 1359-63
(1972).
[Vol. 41:277
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
interference with rights arguably protected by section 7 to warrant the
General Counsel, had a charge been filed by the Union, in issuing a Section
8(a)(1) complaint. 40 Sears had made such a demand and the Carpenters'
union could have filed the unfair labor practice charge. The Court
concluded that the demand by Sears, which it described as "critical to our
holding,' gave the union "a fair opportunity to present the protection
issue to the Labor Board" and "meaningful protection against the risk of
error in a state tribunal., 42 For this reason, and because it supposed that
there was slight chance that the NLRB would find trespassory picketing to
be protected under the NLRA, the Court ruled that the "arguably
protected" character of the union's conduct did not deprive the California
courts of jurisdiction.43
It is hard to imagine a narrower decision. One narrowing factor is the
weight that Justice Stevens gave to what he deemed the low degree of
probability that the union's claim to protection would prevail. Surely, the
union's chance of prevailing would have been higher if the picketing had
44been outside the entrances to a store in a shopping center. Does this mean
that state jurisdiction may be preempted in the shopping center case? I
suppose not, but the opinion leaves the possibility open.
More important, the opinion skillfully narrows the holding to a
situation likely never again to recur. The employer must make a demand
upon the pickets before it can maintain an injunctive action in state court.
At the same time, Sears tells us that the state court has jurisdiction unless
and until the picketing union files a charge with the NLRB General
Counsel alleging that the employer has violated section 8(a)(1). This leaves
open several critical questions. Must an existing temporary injunction be
vacated when the union files its charge? Suppose that the union files its
charge before the state court hearing on the motion for a temporary
injunction. Is the charge alone sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the state
court? Finally, since the NLRB will not decide the case for many months-
even longer if the union stalls, as unions have often done with charges filed
to block an election-does the state court have jurisdiction in the interim,
with the duty of ruling on federal question as best it can? Or does the charge
protect the union by denying the employer a day in court until after the
NLRB renders its decision?
45
The opinion of the Supreme Court is as inscrutable upon these
questions as the silence of the Sphinx. Although Justice Stevens char-
40. Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 18 quoted in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. at 209.
41. 436 U.S. at 207 n.44.
42. Id. at 207.
43. Id. at 208.
44. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977).
45. The problem is perhaps more complex if the pickets are arrested for trespass immediately
upon refusing to leave the premises at the owner-employer's request. See, e.g., State v. Dargon, 165 N.
J. Super. 500. 398 A.2d 891 (1978).
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acterized the union's opportunity to institute an NLRB proceeding as
a method by which the union might protect itself against risk of error in the
state court,4 6 he was careful to avoid saying whether he meant error along
the way or error at the end of the road. The silence appears to have been
necessary to attract the concurrence of six Justices in the opinion of the
Court. Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, stated that the logic of
the Court's opinion dictated the corollary that the mere institution of
NLRB proceedings would be enough to block action by the state court
pending a decision by the NLRB.47 Justice Powell, also concurring,
declared that commencement of NLRB proceedings should not be enough,
and that he would not have joined in the Court's opinion if it were
susceptible to Justice Blackmun's reading.
48
The Sears opinion has three other puzzling aspects. One is Justice
Stevens' surmise that the union will file a section 8(a)(1) charge only if it
expects to win before the Board.49 This surmise is plausible only if the
justice is assuming that no ground is gained by merely filing the charge. If
the union's case is weak but the charge ousts the state court ofjurisdiction,
the union's best tactic obviously is to file the charge and stall.
Second, the observation that the NLRB likely will find very little
trespassory picketing to be protected by the NLRA seems to prejudge a
question whose complexity escaped the Court's attention.50 In the case of a
single store or factory with entrances and exits directly off a public way,
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox51 may support the generalization that the
NLRB will not extend protection to the picketing, although one would
have supposed that a parking lot open to any member of the public who
wishes to buy or even to inspect retail merchandise was fundamentally
different from a lot open only to the employees of a single employer. By
comparison, if the store of an employer engaged in a labor dispute is in a
shopping center or its plant is in an industrial park, the precedents from the
Board and lower courts support the claim of privilege when the pickets are
employees of the picketed establishment.52 In the case of a shopping center,
decisions ultimately may turn upon whether the pickets are employees,
paid organizers, or volunteers, and upon the role of the operator of the
picketed establishment in the labor dispute. One would also suppose that
46. 436 U.S. at 207.
47. Id. at 208-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 212-14 (Powell, J., concurring). The concurrence of Justice Powell, who joined in the
majority opinion by Justice Stevens, was limited to a response to the issues raised by Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion. See text accompanying note 48 supra. In Reece Shirley & Ron's, Inc.
v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 782, 255 Kan. 470,476,592 P.2d 433,437 (1979), the Supreme
Court of Kansas declared that a state court would lose the power to take jurisdiction "if ... the
board takes jurisdiction."
49. 436 U.S. at 206, 207.
50. Id. at 206.
51. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
52. Holland Rantos Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 726, enforced, 583 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1978); Scott
Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977).
[Vol. 41:277
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
trespassory picketing was much more often important in industrial parks
and shopping centers than at individual sites with individual entrances
from a public way. While the observation that trespassory picketing is
likely to be unprotected seems too guarded for so difficult a problem, I
cannot tell whether it applies to all categories of trespassory picketing or
only to the situation at Sears.
Third, obscurity hangs over the novel suggestion that a state court is
to appraise the degree of probability that the union will prevail before the
NLRB in deciding whether the court has jurisdiction. If the human mind
could measure with mathematical precision the risk of misunderstanding
the law, and if all human minds were alike, the degree of risk of depriving
the defendant of a federal right would be an appropriate factor in the
calculus by which preemption vel non was decided. But if all human minds
were alike, state courts always would reach the same conclusion as that
reached by the NLRB and the federal reviewing courts. The Garmon rule
would scarcely be necessary. In formulating the Garmon rule, Justice
Frankfurter, who analyzed the problem in terms of primary jurisdiction,
took account of the differences among judges and established a wide
prophylactic zone--"arguably protected"-from which all but the NLRB
are excluded. The Sears opinion narrows this zone by making the
probability of a union's success before the NLRB a relevant consideration
under some circumstances. By introducing this additional variable factor,
the opinion lessens the predictability of preemption law.53
The importance of the invitation to interpret Sears as narrowing the
zone of federal preemption depends upon a question discussed above-
namely, whether the Garmon rule is the complete test of preemption. If so,
any narrowing is important; if not, then the narrowing of the Garmon rule
probably has only marginal significance because the application of state
laws focused upon union organization, collective bargaining, or labor
disputes would be barred under the principle associated with Garner,
Morton, and Machinists.
B. New York Telephone Co. v. New York Department of Labor
Less than a year after the Sears decision, the Court came to grips with
the question whether a state may provide unemployment compensation to
strikers in an industry subject to NLRB jurisdiction. A New York statute
provides for the payment of unemployment benefits to workers, after an
eight week waiting period, when their employment is terminated by a
strike.55 The benefits are financed primarily by employer contributions.
Each employer's contributions are affected by the claims of his employees
53. In Commonwealth v. Nofke, - Mass. -, 379 N.E.2d 1086 (1978), the
Massachusettes Supreme Judicial Court made such an appraisal in upholding the trespass conviction
of a union organizer who entered a hospital parking lot.
54. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
55. N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 590(7), 592(1) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1978-1979).
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against the state fund. New York Telephone Company, whose employees
had received benefits during a protracted strike, sought a declaratory
judgment that the New York statute mandating the payment of benefits to
strikers at their employer's expense is inconsistent with national labor
policy and therefore invalid under the supremacy clause. The United
States Supreme Court rejected the argument by a 6-3 vote. There was no
opinion of the Court; the six Justices in the majority required three
opinions to explain their divergent views.
All the opinions, including the dissent, seem to accept the premise that
a state law may be unconstitutional even though the Garmon rule does not
condemn it. Drawing upon Garner, Morton and Machinists, Justice
Powell's dissenting opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Stewart, is the most explicit:
The States have no more authority than the Board to upset the balance
that Congress has struck between labor and management in the collective-
bargaining relationship. "For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat
designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the
State were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the
federal Act prohibits."56
Justice Blackmun, speaking for himself and Justice Marshall,
embraced the Morton-Machinists rule.57 Justice Brennan, author of the
Machinists opinion, agreed.58 Justice Stevens,joined by Justice White and
Rehnquist, also took Morton and Machinists as a predicate, even though
the shadow of his earlier skepticism led him to set the decisions apart from
the "main body of labor pre-emption law." 59 In sum, for the first time all
the Justices embraced the basic proposition that the NLRA strikes a
balance of power in matters of union organization and collective
bargaining which a state may not disturb.
The next step in the analysis of the New York Telephone case was to
examine the limits of this basic protection. We may presume that all the
Justices agreed that generality must yield to specific evidence of
congressional intent to allow the states freedom to make their own
decisions on a particular question. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall found such evidence in congressional debates on the Social
Security Act of 1935, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and a proposed 1969
amendment to the Social Security Act. 0 The dissenting Justices found the
evidence totally unpersuasive.6 1 The opinion written by Justice Stevens is
somewhat more equivocal. It examines the legislative history to see
56. 440 U.S. at 554, (Powell, J., dissenting), quoting Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 500
(1953).
57. Id. at 547-49.
58. Id. at 546-47.
59. Id. at 530.
60. Id. at 549, approving Part III of the plurality opinion, which appears id. at 540-45.
61. Id. at 560-67.
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whether there is affirmative evidence of an intent to preempt and observes
that, since Congress knew of the possible impact of unemployment
compensation on the bargaining process, "omission of any direction
concerning payment to strikers in either the National Labor Relations Act
or the Social Security Act implies that Congress intended that the States be
free to authorize or to prohibit, such payments. 62 But in the very next
sentence, the Stevens opinion retreats to the guarded conclusion that "the
congressional silence in 1935 was not evidence of an intent to pre-empt the
States' power to make this policy choice., 63 Thus, only three of nine
Justices were persuaded that the legislative history shows an affirmative
congressional intent not to preempt.
Earlier I suggested that the proposition that Congress has impliedly
barred the states from disturbing the balance of power struck by the
NLRA does not extend so far as to exclude state laws of general
application, that is, laws that do not rest upon legislative, administrative,
or judicial evaluation of the several interests of employers, labor unions,
employees, and the public in union organization, collective bargaining, or
a labor dispute. Justice Stevens, who seemed to go out of his way to
disapprove this suggestion in Sears, accepted the greater part of it in New
York Telephone, saying
the [New York] statute is a law of general applicability. Although that is not a
sufficient reason to exempt it from preemption, . . .our cases have
consistently recognized that a congressional intent to deprive the states of
their power to enforce such general laws is more difficult to infer than an
intent to preempt laws directed specifically at concerted activity.
64
The overtones of the Stevens opinion suggest, without saying, that,
when a state law of general application is at issue, the burden of proving
congressional intent to .preempt rests upon the party seeking to escape state
law, while in the instance of a state law directed specifically at concerted
activity, the party seeking application of the state law must adduce specific
evidence of an intent not to preempt. This is the only reasoning left to
support the conclusion reached by Justice Stevens once he rejects the
argument that the legislative history supplies specific evidence of an intent
to preempt the application of laws calling for payment of unemployment
compensation to workers engaged in a labor dispute.
Only three Justices took this approach. Justice Brennan observed that
he was not completely at ease with the distinctions made by Justice Stevens
in setting limits upon the Morton-Machinists principles.65 Justice
Blackmun, speaking for himself and Justice Marshall, viewed Justice
Stevens' distinction as a departure "from the principles of Machinists"
when applied "to a case where a State alters the balance struck by Congress
62. Id. at 544.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 533.
65. Id. at 546-47.
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
by conferring a benefit on a broadly defined class of citizens rather than by
regulating more explicitly the conduct of parties to a labor-management
dispute."66 Justice Powell, speaking for the three dissenting Justices,
disputed the conclusion that the challenged statute was a law of general
applicability and also declared:
Even if the challenged portion of the New York statute could be viewed as
part of a law of general applicability, this generality of the law would have
little or nothing to do with whether it is preempted by the NLRA. A state law
with purposes and applications beyond the area of industrial relations may
nonetheless impinge upon congressional policy when it is applied to the
collective-bargaining relationship.67
The disagreement over whether the provision of the New York statute
making strikers eligible for unemployment compensation is a "law of
general applicability" is a useful reminder that neither formulae nor even
precise definitions can take the place of judgment in rendering judicial
decisions. The New York unemployment compensation law, taken as a
whole, appears to rest on general concerns roughly similar to those
supporting the payment of public welfare.68 Looking to the debates in state
legislatures upon whether strikers should be eligible for unemployment
compensation, one finds attention focused upon the effect of payment of
the benefits on collective bargaining and labor-management disputes.
Perhaps the wisest approach is to keep the importance of the distinction
between labor-management laws and laws of general application in mind,
but to avoid rigid classification in close cases. In a borderline case one
would then hae only a slight disposition to infer an intent to preempt from
the character of the legislation, and one would be quick to accept
indications of congressional intent to allow states to decide for themselves.
I suspect that the six Justices who made up the majority in New York
Telephone came closer to sharing this approach than the opinions indicate,
and that the differences in the opinions are more of emphasis than of
principle. The congressional debates leave little doubt about the un-
willingness of Congress to render an explicit national decision upon the
eligibility of strikers for unemployment benefits. A Senator or Represen-
tative could share that reluctance, yet still logically suppose that the policy
of the NLRA applies so strongly as to imply a national decision to bar a
state from providing compensation. To attribute such a nicely balanced
state of mind to Congress seems implausible, however, when the state law
lies in a general field somewhat removed from labor-management
relations. 69 The New York Telephone case therefore should be viewed
66. Id. at 549-50.
67. Id. at 557-58.
68. In such cases the courts of appeals held that there was no federal preemption. See, e.g., Super
Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977).
69. It is entirely plausible to attribute the above state of mind to a congressman who is trying to
avoid taking a public position, but I question the relevance of this hypothesis when a court is
attempting to accomodate several pieces of legislation in the same area.
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chiefly as a particular controversy that turns primarily upon one's
characterization of the specific provision of the unemployment compensa-
tion law and upon the conclusions drawn from unsuccessful legislative
attempts to enact a national rule.
The broader implications for federal law preemption are two. First,
the notion that the Garmon formula and its exceptions embody the whole
law of labor preemption has been abandoned. All nine Justices accepted
the view that the NLRA provisions protecting some conduct, prohibiting
other conduct, and leaving still other conduct neither protected nor
prohibited establish an accommodation of the interests of employers,
employees, labor unions, and the public in union organization and
collective bargaining which, in the absence of other evidence, impliedly
excludes any state law based upon a different legislative or judicial
determination as to where the balance should be struck. Second, perhaps a
majority of the Court is willing to imply from the existence of this
congressional accommodation an intent to bar the application of state
laws that significantly or substantially disturb the balance reached by
Congress, even though the state laws rest upon broader considerations. I
say "perhaps" because the views expressed in the dissenting opinion upon
this point strike one as somewhat inconsistent with the normal attitudes of
the Chief Justice and Justice Powell. The Chief Justice usually is strongly
disposed to uphold exercises of state power against claims of federal
jurisdiction. Justice Powell leans less far in that direction, and although the
results of New York Telephone and Machinists are entirely consistent, the
language of his New York Telephone opinion seems wholly inconsistent
with his earlier, separate statement in Machinists, in which Justice Powell
stated:
I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's opinion does not,
however, preclude the States from enforcing in the context of a labor dispute,
"neutral" state statutes or rules of decision: state laws that are not directed
towards altering the bargaining positions of employers or unions but which
may have an incidental effect on relative bargaining strength?0
The Chief Justice joined Justice Powell in both statements. Apparently,
their result-oriented belief that a business should be protected against a
state-imposed duty to contribute to the support of men and women on
strike against the management was stronger then their normal principled
preference for state rights.
The final lesson of the New York Telephone case, in my view, is that
judgments about the intent of Congress with respect to the exclusion or
toleration of state law require a sense of separable areas of discourse. New
York Telephone argued with much logic that the state law altered the
balance of economic bargaining power between management and labor by
helping to finance strikes. The fundamental weakness in this argument was
70. 427 U.S. at 156. Co law is wholly "neutral" if it requires one party to desist from tactics that
the party considers to be useful in a labor dispute.
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that Congress, in enacting the National Labor Relations Act and the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),71 was not concerned with
everything affecting labor-management relations or the balance of power
in collective bargaining. In writing those laws Congress was concerned
only with the rules rather directly defining rights, privileges, and duties in
the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements,
and the use of economic weapons or other forms of self-help in contests
over unionization or the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Welfare, social security, and unemployment compensation all have
substantial effects upon such contests because, like many other laws, they
may affect the relative bargaining power of the parties to the contest. But
their effects are indirect. They belong in a different sphere. They were part
of the context of the NLRA and the LMRA, not part of their subject
matter. The verbal logic helpful in defining the extent of federal
preemption in one sphere should not be carried over into the other.
Although this is not the reasoning of any of the opinions by a Justice in the
New York Telephone majority, I suspect that some such judgment in-
fluenced them all.
II. STATE REGULATION OF THE TERMS OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
A similar approach seems appropriate injudging the validity of a state
law uniformly regulating wages, hours, or some other term or condition of
employment in one or more industries without regard to whether the
employees have selected collective bargaining representatives. In
Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination,2 it appeared that the employer and the union had negotiated
a comprehensive disability plan which provided that the normal disability
benefits would not be paid during a pregnancy-related leave of absence.
The omission did not violate the then existing federal laws against sex
discrimination in employment, as interpreted in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert.73 The Massachusetts Commission, refusing to follow that
decision, held that the omission violated Massachusetts law. The employer
replied that "the extent of disability benefits, which was a mandatory
subject of bargaining, is to be left under federal labor law to the free
regulation of the parties. 74 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
rejected the argument upon two grounds: (1) the discrimination "touches
71. 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970)).
72. - Mass._ 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Accord: Brown Co. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor
and Human Relations, 476 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Wis. 1979), relying on Malone v. White Motor Corp.,
435 U.S. 497 (1978), which is discussed later in this Article. In other cases the argument for preemption
was usually pitched upon the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No.
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974), but was equally unsuccessful. See Bucyrus Erie Co. v. Department of
Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979).
73. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
74. __ Mass. -_---, 375 N.E.2d at 1202.
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interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" that State law
might continue to govern despite the NLRA and (2) discrimination is only
a "peripheral concern" of the NLRA.
75
Neither reason seems adequate. Putting matters of union security to
one side, all substantive terms and conditions of employment are equally
"peripheral" to NLRA policy. Nor is there any basis for saying that the
local interest in preventing employment discrimination is greater or more
"deeply-rooted" than the local interest in regulating many other sub-
stantive terms and conditions of employment.
One can readily imagine other situations raising the question of a
state's power to impose statutory regulation of a term or condition of
employment inconsistent with the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. Massachusetts anticipated the federal government's prohibi-
tion against aged-based discrimination in employment.76 Suppose that a
collective bargaining agreement had provided for mandatory retirement at
an age below that specified in the state statute. Would the collective
bargaining agreement have been a defense to the charge of violation of
state law? Similarly, suppose that a collective agreement gives an employee
who is a minor a right to bid for and receive a particularjob in which the
employment of minors is forbidden by state law. Does the state law or the
contract control? What about a state ceiling upon wage increases?
Free from direct precedent, I would have supposed that the NLRA
leaves the states free to regulate employment conditions, provided that the
state legislation does not discriminate against collective bargaining. The
NLRA is primarily concerned with a method of establishing terms and
conditions of employment; it protects and even encourages substituting
negotiations between the employer and the employees as a group, backed
by freedom to resort to economic weapons, in place of the older methods of
unilateral dictation or individual bargaining. There is not the slightest
reason to suppose that Congress intended to allow unions and employers,
acting jointly, to establish employment conditions that a state forbids
employers to establish unilaterally or by individual bargain. Serious
interference with the substitution of one method for another would not
result from allowing a state to outlaw substantive conditions of em-
ployment that the state regards as undesirable without regard to the
method by which they are established. Preemption is required only if state
law limits the terms that may be included in collective agreements while
leaving employers free to establish the same conditions unilaterally or by
negotiation with individuals. To put the point a little differently, reasoning
about Congress' intent to the exclusion or toleration of state laws
regulating substantive terms and conditions of employment seems to me to
require that the areas of discourse be observed, as I suggested in discussing
75. Id.
76. 1937 Mass. Acts, ch. 367, § 2.
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unemployment insurance and the rights of individual members against the
union.
The reasoning of the opinion in Teamsters Union v. Olive? 7 is totally
opposed to this suggestion. Oliver was the owner and occasionally the
operator of trucking equipment that he leased to another carier. The
Central States Agreement between the Teamsters and the carriers
prescribed in careful detail the wages to be paid owner-drivers, their
working conditions, and the separate rental to be paid for equipment.
Oliver brought an action in the Ohio courts to enjoin the Teamsters and the
carriers from implementing the contract on the ground that it violated the
Ohio anti-trust law. The Ohio courts granted the injunction.78 The United
States Supreme Court reversed. The Court first decided that the clause in
the Central States Agreement was a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining under section 8(d) of the NLRA. It then posed the following
question: "Whether Ohio's anti-trust law may be applied to prevent the
contracting parties from carrying out their agreement upon a subject
matter as to which the federal law directs them to begin."79 The Court had
little difficulty in concluding that Ohio law cannot be so applied. After
describing the goal of federal labor policy expressed in the NLRA, the
Court concluded: "we believe that there is no room in this scheme for the
application here of this State policy limiting the solutions that the parties'
agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working con-
ditions. ' 8°
The Court's language is manifestly inconsistent with the approach
suggested above. An exception for employment discrimination must be
interpolated in order to justify the Massachusetts Electric decision. On the
other hand, the language is also manifestly broader than required to decide
the only issue that was before the Court. The Ohio courts had held that
Ohio's anti-trust law was violated because an association of employers and
a labor union had agreed upon the compensation and rental for owner-
operated trucking equipment. The state had formulated no policy with
respect to those subjects, save that they should not be fixed by collective
bargaining. It was, in short, the method to which the state objected. The
NLRA prescribed a method that the state attempted to proscribe.
Obviously, the state law had to yield, but there was no occasion to decide
whether an employer and the representatives of its employees can by
agreement override a state law fixing a substantive term or condition of
employment for employers and employees without regard to how their
relations are conducted.
The opinions in Malone v. White Motor Co.,8" although far from
77. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
78. 167 Ohio St. 299, 147 N.E.2d 856 (1958).
79. 358 U.S. at 295.
80. Id. at 296.
81. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
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dispositive, suggest that Oliver may not be the final word. In the 1960's, the
United Automobile Workers and a subsidiary of White Motor Co. had
agreed in collective bargaining upon a retirement and pension plan that
only partially funded the promised pensions. The beneficiary's rights were
nonetheless strictly limited to payments from the fund. The subsidiary
corporation also reserved the absolute right to terminate its liability at any
time. In 1968 and 1971, White Motor guaranteed certain payments at
levels higher than the fund could support but still below the levels fixed in
the plan. Early in 1974, Minnesota enacted legislation imposing upon
employers who had established a pension plan a"pension funding charge"
sufficient to ensure that employees with ten years seniority would obtain
the level of benefits set by the plan, even though the plan was not fully
funded and was terminated before the rights of the employees had vested. 12
Shortly after enactment of the statute, White terminated the plan. When
the state sought to compel payment of the funding charge, White asked the
United States District Court to enjoin collection upon the ground that the
Minnesota statute "interferes with the right . . . to free collective
bargaining under federal law and . . . vitiates collective bargaining
agreements entered into under the authority of federal law.,
83
The district court rejected the claim of federal preemption, 4 but the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sustained it, partly upon the
ground that since "states cannot control the economic weapons of the
parties at the bargaining table, afortiori they may not directly control the
substantive terms of the contract which results from that bargaining,"85
and partly on the ground that "a state cannot modify an otherwise valid
and effective provision of a collective bargaining agreement., 86 The
reasoning rather plainly implies that any collective bargaining agreement
negotiated between an employer and representatives of employees subject
to NLRB jurisdiction upon a statutory subject of bargaining prevails over
an inconsistent state law.
Three of the seven Supreme Court Justices who participated in the
decision followed the same reasoning, albeit in dissent. Justice Stewart was
most explicit in asserting that the case was governed by "[t]he fundamental
policy of the national labor laws to leave undisturbed 'the parties' solution
of a problem which Congress required them to negotiate in good faith
towards solving .. ,87 Justice Powell also relied upon "the national
labor policy barring interference by the States with privately negotiated
solutions to problems involving mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining."8 The Chief Justice concurred in both dissenting opinions.
82. MINN. STAT. § 181 B. 01 (1976).
83. 435 U.S. at 502.
84. 412 F. Supp. 599 (D. Minn. 1976).
85. 545 F.2d 599, 606 (1976).
86. Id.
87. 435 U.S. at 515-16.
88. Id. at 516.
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A four-man majority, speaking through Justice White, disagreed. The
bulk of the opinion is devoted to showing that section 10 of the federal
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act89 manifested a congressional
intention to retain state regulation of welfare and pension plans. That
question need not detain us. Since January 1, 1975, section 514 of the
federal Employee Retirement Security Income Act of 197490 has ousted
state regulation of employee pension plans. The remaining, challenging
question is whether Justice White and his colleagues would agree with the
dissenters that, in the absence of other specific intent, the national labor
policy prevents a state from fixing by statute a term or condition of
employment different from what is stipulated in a collective bargaining
agreement. The White Motor opinion seems carefully non-committal:
There is nothing in the NLRA . . . which expressly forecloses all state
regulatory power with respect to those issues . . . that may be the subject of
collective bargaining. If the [State] Pension Act is preempted here, the
congressional intent to do so must be implied from the relevant provisions of
the labor statutes. We have concluded, however, that such implication should
not be made here and that a far more reliable intent . . . is to be found in §
10 of the Disclosure Act.91
Perhaps the question whether an employer and the representatives of
its employees can override a state law fixing a substantive term or
condition of employment for all coveied establishments, regardless of
whether the employees have organized, has little practical importance. The
absence of litigation would so suggest. I am inclined to think, however,
that if the question were to be litigated, Teamsters Union v. Oliver might
well be cut back to the narrower rule that I have suggested. The majority
opinion in Malone v. White Motor Corp. would lend substance to the
argument if only because it carefully avoided espousing the views of the
dissenters.
III. CONCLUSION
The divisions among the Justices in the Sears, New York Telephone
and Malone cases suggest that praise and criticism of the decisions may be
equally divided. All three decisions commend themselves to me. The
opinions, however, do nothing to clarify the principles that govern federal
preemption in labor law. One perceives little interest in logical consistency
and less interest in building a coherent and continuing body of law.
Perhaps this characteristic results from the increasing influence upon
Court opinions of law clerks serving for single one-year terms and assigned
to write an opinion justifying a vote already cast. Perhaps it reflects a
predominance of Justices who are primarily pragmatists more concerned
with the immediate outcome than with building a coherent body of law.
89. 72 Stat. 997 (1958), repealed by, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §
11 l(a)(1), 88 Stat. 829, 832 (1974).
90. 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976)).
91. 435 U.S. at 504-05.
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